Using Code Read Protection in LPC1100 and LPC1300Rev. 1 — 19 August 2010Applicate

Application note

Document information

Info	Content
Keywords	LPC11xx, LPC13xx, M0, CRP, ISP, LPCXpresso
Abstract	A comparison of CRP levels supported by the LPC1100/LPC1300 part families, as well as an overview of using CRP in LPCXpresso



Using Code Read Protection in LPC1100 and LPC1300

Revision history

Rev	Date	Description
1	20100819	Initial version.

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1. Introduction

Code Read Protection is a mechanism that allows users to enable different levels of security in the system so they can protect both their software code and hardware.

LPC1100/LPC1300 devices have three different active security levels: CRP1, CRP2, and CRP3. Each mode increases the security level, with CRP3 restricting any access to the device. These devices also feature a new protection level "NO_ISP" which will suppress response to the ISP pin at system startup (but will not prevent debug via SWD, nor will it prevent read access to flash memory). In this application note we examine all these security levels and how to use them according to various security requirements. We also provide an example to test all of these modes. This application note will make use of the LPCXpresso1114 or LPCXpresso1343 Evaluation boards and the LPCXpresso IDE.

CAUTION: Although the example used in this application note was carefully tested, it is recommended that the user initially configure the device to a level lower than CRP3. Once the code is successfully tested, CRP3 can be used with confidence.

2. Flash memory access methods

In general the LPC1100/LPC1300 flash memory can be accessed in two different ways:

- Using the SWD flash programming interface: This is the method that Debug tools use in order to download code into the device and start/stop execution.
- Using In-System Programming (ISP): This method is provided by the boot loader using UART0 serial port (or USB for LPC1300).

3. Understanding CRP security levels

As the name implies, Code Read Protection (CRP) provides a method for users to protect their code from being read from the device flash. In this way, designers can prevent unauthorized users from obtaining their object code which could be disassembled or downloaded onto another hardware platform. Please be aware that all changes to CRP require a power cycle to take place before becoming active.

Notice that from Fig 1 that all active CRP levels will disable Serial-Wire-Debug. By disabling debug access, memory contents cannot be read (or written) by an unauthorized party using widely available debugging equipment. A consequence of this, however, is that should CRP be accidentally enabled during development, debugging cannot take place until the part has been erased via ISP and programmed with code which does not enable CRP. Active CRP levels disable memory read back when LPC1100 and LPC1300 devices are booted into ISP mode as well. CRP settings have no effect on IAP commands (which are executed programmatically by application code).

CRP Level 1 is designed to prevent read access to the device while enabling modification of flash memory on a sector by sector basis. Note that sector 0 can only be erased when fully erasing the device, and cannot be written to when CRP1 is enabled. This effectively prevents modification to sector 0. CRP1 is required, for example, when a design dedicates one or more sectors of flash to storing calibration information or serial numbers, etc. If a full chip erase were to take place during a firmware update, this calibration information would be lost. CRP1 can also be useful, for example, should a design implement a custom secured bootloader. This would program sector 0 and only

allow field updates to modify the "application" sectors while enabling the bootloader to persist in an unmodified state.

Though it is unlikely, it is conceivable that an attacker with knowledge about a system could partially overwrite firmware in such a way as to gain read access to internal flash memory. To prevent this, CRP Level 2 further increases security by only supporting full chip erasure. This ensures that devices are entirely blank prior to updates, and therefore not susceptible to modification by an attacker.

CRP Level 3 is the highest level supported by the LPC1100/LPC1300 devices. In sophisticated reverse engineering, an intellectual property thief may be able to learn proprietary information about a design by fully erasing and then programming the target device with custom test code and analyzing how the PCB behaves. This would then enable the thief to implement a counterfeit design without ever having read original object code. CRP Level 3 effectively disables ISP functionality¹ and SWD, thus the device's flash memory can no longer be modified. Should there be instances where hardware cannot be allowed to run unauthorized code, CRP Level 3 should be used. **Be aware that there is no built-in recovery for designs once CRP Level 3 is enabled.** The most simplistic way of implementing a custom recovery mechanism involves the "Re-Invoke ISP" IAP call.

	Read Code	Full Erase	Erase Sectors	Program Sectors	SWD Access
NO CRP	Enabled	Enabled	Enabled	Enabled	Enabled
CPR 1	Disabled	Enabled	Enabled	Enabled	Disabled
CRP 2	Disabled	Enabled	Disabled	Enabled	Disabled
CRP 3	Disabled	Disabled	Disabled	Disabled	Disabled
NO_ISP	No Protection	Disabled	Disabled	Disabled	Enabled

Note that Sector 0 is not erasable when CRP1 is enabled unless a full device erase takes place

Fig 1. Comparison of CRP levels

4. Secondary/encrypted bootloaders

If a designer is going to take the additional effort to protect their devices from design theft, dealing with field updates should be taken into consideration. If an application will enable CRP, it is usually a good practice to develop a custom encrypted bootloader to allow field updates. Distributing unencrypted object code for the updating process defeats the notion of protecting the design.

Designs making use of the USB features of the LPC1300 part families may also consider implementing an encrypted USB based secondary bootloader, as is typically done in DFU applications.

5. NO_ISP

The LPC1100/LPC1300 families of parts feature a new CRP mode, "NO_ISP". This will prevent the on chip bootloader from sampling the ISP pin at start up. There are cases in which external devices may drive a signal on the ISP pin of a device. In the event of a power failure that causes a brown out event, the LPC1100/LPC1300 device may restart

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^{1.} Designs with CRP3 can allow reprogramming by implementing a custom bootloader which uses IAP commands to modify flash memory contents.

and find that the ISP pin is erroneously being asserted. To prevent the possibility of an accidental invocation of ISP, designers can enable the "NO_ISP" mode. Be aware that NO_ISP does not prevent theft of intellectual property, as debugger access remains enabled, and flash contents can be read back via this mechanism.

6. Example: Using CRP with LPCXpresso

LPCXpresso is distributed with projects for both LPC1100 and LPC1300 families which make use of CRP. Designers who anticipate using CRP in their applications are encouraged to use these example projects as starting points for their designs.

When using UART based ISP with the LPC1300 and FlashMagic, refer to the LPCXpresso Base Board's User Manual for details about proper jumper configuration. With all jumpers in the default locations, the LPC1300 evaluation board will operate in USB based ISP mode.

The LPC1100 is able to operate with FlashMagic with all jumpers in their default locations.

Controlling CRP in LPCXpresso projects is done in two parts:


- Defining a constant which sets the appropriate CRP level
- Configuring the linker with custom scripts to place this constant at the CRP memory address (0x2FC)

Fig 2 shows how a developer can go about defining a constant which is assigned with their desired CRP level. The attribute directive ensures that the constant (in this example CRP_WORD) is placed in a special ".crp" section of memory by the linker.

```
#define NO_CRP
                        0xffffffff
#define NO_ISP_MAGIC
                        0x4E697370
#define CRP1_MAGIC
                        0x12345678
#define CRP2 MAGIC
                        0x87654321
/**** DANGER CRP3 WILL LOCK PART TO ALL READS and WRITES ****/
/********* #define CRP3 MAGIC xxxx 0x43218765 ***********/
#define CURRENT_CRP_SETTING NO_CRP
             ((section(".<u>crp</u>"))) const uint32_t CRP_WORD =
 attribute
CURRENT_CRP_SETTING;
•••
Fig 2.
      Excerpt from CRP example (C source code)
```

The second part of the two step process involves configuring the linker to place the constant at the proper memory location. This is done via custom linker scripts. The process for manually configuring the linker in LPCXpresso is outlined in <u>Appendix A</u>.

The major difference between the custom linker script and the automatically generated one can be seen in Fig 5. Notice that the ".crp" section is defined in the script, and begins at address 0x2FC, the CRP memory address for LPC1100/LPC1300 devices.





Step 1 - Communi) 🍏 🗸 🎩 ≽ 왕 I ications	Step 2 - Erase
Oscillator (MHz):	COM 3 9600 Nore Security	Erase block 0 (0x000000-0x000FFF) Erase block 1 (0x001000-0x001FFF) Erase block 2 (0x002000-0x002FFF) Erase block 3 (0x003000-0x003FFF) Erase block 4 (0x004000-0x004FFF) Frase block 4 (0x004000-0x004FFF) Frase block 4 (0x004000-0x005FFF) Erase block 5 (0x0040000-0x005FFF) Erase block 5 (0x0040000-0x005FFF) Eras
Step 3 - Hex File Hex File: C:\Doo Modified Step 4 - Options		Close bistartt
Verify after prog Fill unused Flas Gen block che Execute	:h	Start
·	tomizable, remotelu undated In	ternet links. Embed them in your

```
...
ENTRY (ResetISR)
SECTIONS
{
    .text :
    {
        KEEP(*(.isr_vector))
        . = 0x000002FC;
        KEEP(*(.crp))
        *(.text*)
        *(.rodata*)
        } > MFlash32
...
(1) Bold text indicates changes from automatically generated linker script
Fig 5. Excerpt from CRP example (custom linker script)
```

7. Conclusion

By learning how to enable CRP, designers can prevent the theft of their intellectual property. This application note has detailed the differences between each of the CRP levels, and has shed light onto some of the conditions that might lead a developer to choose one level rather than another. Details of potential pitfalls that can occur when using CRP have been provided in the hopes that developers might avoid them. When using the LPCXpresso IDE developers can add CRP to their designs by creating a special segment of memory, and placing a constant in it.

8. Appendix A

Several steps are required to specify a custom linker script² set. First make a new folder in the project named "custom_Id". This will store the customized script files. Next copy the automatically generated linker scripts with ".Id" extensions from the active target folder (typically "Debug" or "Release") into the "custom_Id" folder. Fig 6 illustrates where the automatically generated scripts are stored in the project. Rename the file as per <u>Table 1</u>. Before you modify the content of the scripts, you need to ensure that the toolchain is configured to use them as seen in Fig 7. Add the ".crp" section to Custom.Id as show in Fig 5. Finally update Custom.Id to point to the Custom_mem.Id and Custom_lib.Id scripts in the newly created custom_Id folder. An example of this is shown in Fig 8.


 Table 1.
 Renamed linker scripts


Original name	Renamed copy
PROJECTNAME_Debug.ld	Custom.ld
PROJECTNAME_Debug_mem.ld	Custom_mem.ld
PROJECTNAME_Debug_lib.ld	Custom_lib.ld

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^{2.} http://lpcxpresso.code-red-tech.com/LPCXpresso/node/31

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/*

* GENERATED FILE - DO NOT EDIT

* (C) Code Red Technologies Ltd,

* Generated C linker script file for LPC1114

*/

INCLUDE "../custom_ld / Custom_lib.ld "

INCLUDE "../custom Id /Custom mem.Id "

ENTRY(ResetISR) ...

(1) Underline indicates changes from original file

Fig 8. Modifications to "Custom.Id" linker script

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